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Insurance
by Bradley S. Wolfft
Maren R. Cave"
and Stephen M. Schatz m
I. INTRODUCTION

During this survey period, the Georgia state and federal courts decided
questions of first impression related to uninsured motorist (UM) coverage
holding that, although umbrella policies are no longer required to provide
UM coverage, the statutory notice requirements must be strictly followed
before such coverage can be dropped in a renewal and that the "vertical
exhaustion requirements" contained in excess policies do not violate the
UM statute. Another first impression decision involved the correct
interpretation of the statute providing for pre-suit offers in motor vehicle
injury cases and whether timely payment may be a condition of
acceptance. Other cases decided in this period included decisions
addressing the interpretation, enforcement and reformation of policy
language, whether use of a vehicle in violation of company policy is
contrary to coverage for a permissive user, single versus multiple
occurrences, and exclusions from coverage.'

*Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., cum laude, 1983); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1986). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
"Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. St. Olaf
College (B.A., 1997); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 20p0). Member, State Bar of
Georgia; Atlanta Bar Association; The CLM Alliance; Defense Research Institute; Georgia
Defense Lawyers Association; Lawyers Club of Atlanta; Order of Barristers.
*"Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Virginia (B.A., with distinction, 1985); University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School
of Law (J.D., 1988). Member, State Bar of Georgia (Member, Tort and Insurance Practice
and Litigation); Defense Research Institute.
1. For an analysis of insurance law during the prior survey period, see Maren R.
Cave, Stephen Schatz & Bradley S. Wolff, Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 68
MERCER L. REV. 133 (2016).
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II. UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE ISSUES

A. Strict Compliance and Proof Required to Terminate UM Coverage in
an Umbrella Policy
In Massey v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2 the Georgia Court of Appeals held
as a matter of first impression that Georgia's statute governing the
cancellation and nonrenewal of automobile insurance policies, section
33-24-453 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), applies to
the uninsured motorist coverage in umbrella policies even after the 2008
amendment to O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11,4 which exempted umbrella policies
from the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11.5 The court determined that
Allstate was therefore required to follow the statute's notice
requirements when it decided not to renew the UM coverage previously
included in Massey's umbrella policy. 6 In interpreting O.C.G.A. § 33-2445, the court held that nothing in the plain language of the statute
limited "automobile policies" to primary policies only, nor excluded
umbrella policies that included automobile coverage. 7 Further, the court
held that the Georgia General Assembly's amendment of O.C.G.A. § 337-11 could not also impose a limitation on the scope of O.C.G.A. § 33-2445 without doing so expressly. 8
Having determined that the nonrenewal statute applied to Massey's
umbrella policy, the court next considered whether Allstate sufficiently
proved compliance with the statute's notice requirements.9 These
requirements include notice to the policyholder by personal delivery or
U.S. mail.10 When mailed, proof of a postal receipt issued by the U.S. Post
Office must be "exactly followed" or the notice of nonrenewal will be
ineffective." Although Allstate produced some evidence showing that it
had sent the required notice to its policyholder, it could not produce a
postal receipt. 12 The court rejected Allstate's argument that requiring an
insurance company to retain and produce a U.S. Post Office receipt for a

2. 341 Ga. App. 462, 800 S.E.2d 629 (2017).
3. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45 (2017).
4. Ga. S. Bill 276, Reg. Sess., 2008 Ga. Laws 801 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
33-7-11, 33-9-4, and 33-9-21).
5. Massey, 341 Ga. App. at 466-67, 800 S.E.2d at 633-34.
6. Id. at 467, 800 S.E.2d at 634.
7. Id. at 465, 800 S.E.2d at 633.
8. Id. at 466, 800 S.E.2d at 633.
9. Id. at 467, 800 S.E.2d at 634.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 468, 800 S.E.2d at 634.
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mailing four years earlier would be unreasonable 1 3 and held that
Massey's UM coverage was renewed with the same coverage limits as
had been previously provided. 14
B. UM CarrierMust Prove Insured Made an Affirmative Choice of
Unequal Limits
Section 33-7-11(a) 15 of the O.C.G.A. makes a policy's UM limits equal
to the liability limits by default, but an insured may "affirmatively
choose" lower limits for UM.16 In Government Employees Insurance Co.
v. Morgan,17 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that where an insured
adds UJM coverage to a policy after having previously rejected that
coverage, the insured has a new opportunity to choose the policy limits
and must make an affirmative choice of lower UM limits or the policy will
be construed to provide UM coverage with limits equal to the liability
coverage limits.18 The court in Morgan also held the insurer must prove
the insured made such an election and the insured's passive acceptance
without objection of several years of policy renewal declarations showing
the policy limits were insufficient to carry that burden of proof.19
The issue in this case began with the Morgans's election to discontinue
their UM coverage between 1992 and August 2003. When the Morgans
renewed their UM coverage in August 2003, they were allegedly not
aware of the limits of their UM coverage and did not discuss the limits
during the renewal process. After a loss, the insureds claimed their UM
coverage should have had limits equal to their liability limits. 20 In
holding for the Morgans, the court stressed that the statute required an
affirmative choice by the insured to have a lower amount of UM
coverage. 21 Although the insured's choice need not be in writing, the
insurer must come forward with evidence that shows an insured's

13. Id. The court also rejected Allstate's alternative arguments that notice of
nonrenewal was not required at all and that if the umbrella policy were found to include
UM coverage, such coverage should be limited to $1 million because that was the amount
of the umbrella policy's liability coverage upon renewal. Id. at 468-69, 800 S.E.2d at 635.
14. Id. at 468, 800 S.E.2d at 635.
15. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a) (2017).
16. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1); Soufi v. Haygood, 282 Ga. App. 593, 594-95, 639 S.E.2d
395, 397 (2006).
17. 341 Ga. App. 396, 800 S.E.2d 612 (2017).
18. Id. at 400, 800 S.E.2d at 615.
19. Id. at 400-02, 800 S.E.2d at 615-16.
20. Id. at 397-98, 800 S.E.2d at 614.
21. Id. at 397-400, 800 S.E.2d at 614-15.
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affirmative choice rather than merely passive acceptance of the lower
limits.

22

C. An Insured Must Exhaust all UnderlyingInsurance Policies Before
Recovering UM Benefits from Excess Insurers
In Coker v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.,23 another
matter of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit determined that the vertical exhaustion requirements
of the defendant-insurers' excess liability policies superseded O.C.G.A.
§ 33-7-11.24 In Coker, while driving a truck owned by his then employer,
Ansco, a third-party driver struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the
other driver, which resulted in a $5.5 million consent judgment against
the other driver. 25
The defendant was severely underinsured, and there was no dispute
that at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was an insured under
Ansco's multiple policies. Ansco's policies were structured vertically as
follows: Liberty Mutual provided the first layer of coverage with limits of
$5 million; Westchester Fire Insurance provided the next level of
coverage with limits of $10 million; Great American Insurance, American
Guarantee and Liability Insurance, and Endurance American Specialty
Insurance provided the next three layers of protection, respectively. 26
The plaintiff settled with Liberty Mutual and Westchester for less
than their policy limits, and a substantial portion of the judgment
remained unpaid. He then sought UM benefits from the three remaining
excess carriers and brought suit when they refused to pay. 27 The issue
before the court was whether Coker's failure to exhaust the Liberty
Mutual and Westchester policies precluded Coker's recovery from the
excess insurers.28

In affirming summary judgment to the insurers, the court based its
reasoning on three premises. 29 First, the court held that O.C.G.A. § 33-711 does not void "the vertical exhaustion requirements of umbrella and
excess liability policies governed by Georgia law." 30 Second, the court

determined that nothing in the section "proscribes the use of coverage

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 399, 800 S.E.2d at 615.
825 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1289.
Id.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1295-96.
Id. at 1295.
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limitations that depend on the exhaustion of underlying policy limits in
a tiered insurance scheme." 31 Third, the court determined that a vertical
exhaustion requirement does not undermine the remedial purpose of
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11.32
The court noted a potential tension between vertical exhaustion
requirements and Georgia law that UM insurers have "a statutory
obligation to provide UM coverage up to the injury limits of their
respective policies." 33 However, the court determined the operation of
that section, unlike "other provisions" of insurance policies voided by
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11,34 did not void the vertical exhaustion requirements. 35
As the court put it, "[w]ithout an explicit proscription from the Georgia
courts, we cannot conclude that section 33-7-11 would render void the
vertical exhaustion requirement that, under Georgia law, is the defining
characteristic of an excess liability policy." 36

The court in Coker cited Progressive Classic Insurance Co. v.
Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 37 where the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that an umbrella policy "more closely identified" with the
deceased must pay before a more remote primary policy, and
distinguished the "vertical exhaustion" requirement at issue in Coker
from cases involving "horizontally aligned" policies where "other
insurance" clauses contrary to the stacking rules developed by the courts
have been held void. 38
D. Notice: "Promptly"is not 'As Soon As Possible"and Policy Language
Determines Outcomes
Auto insurance policies typically require a person claiming UM
benefits to notify the insurer of an accident. The various descriptions of
the time period within which such notice must be given has been the
subject of occasional litigation. In Progressive Mutual Insurance Co. v.

31. Id. at 1296.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1293.
34. See, e.g., Progressive Classic Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire. Ins. Co., 294 Ga.
App. 787, 791, 670 S.E.2d 497, 501 (2008).
35. Coker, 825 F.3d at 1295.
36. Id. at 1296.
37. 294 Ga. App. 787, 670 S.E.2d 497 (2008).
38. Coker, 825 F.3d at 1295-96; see also St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Goza, 137 Ga.
App. 581, 584, 224 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1976). The court in Goza explained, "where an 'other
insurance' policy provision attempts to limit coverage to sums which are in excess of other
uninsured motorist protection, it conflicts with the plain terms of the statute [O.C.G.A. § 337-11], and is ofno effect." Goza, 137 Ga. App. at 584, 224 S.E.2d at 431.
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Bishop 39 and GEICO Indemnity Co. v. Smith, 40 the Georgia Court of
Appeals reached opposite results regarding insurance policy notice
requirements. 41
In Bishop, the court held that the claimants' failure to notify
Progressive of an accident until ten months and twenty-five days after
its occurrence was not unreasonable as a matter of law, and the court
affirmed the decision of the trial court. 42 In that case, Bishop's policy
provided the following:
For coverage to apply under this policy, you or the person seeking
coverage must promptly report each accident or loss even if you or the
person seeking coverage is not at fault. You or the person seeking
coverage must provide us with all accident/loss information including
time, place, and how the accident or loss happened. 43
The court, relying on the policy's lack of a requirement for the insured
to give notice within a specific period of time, held that timeliness of the
notice was a jury question. 44 The court concluded its opinion by pointing
out that Progressive was responsible for creating a jury question by using
"promptly" rather than stating a more definite time period. 45
In contrast, the court in Smith held that the trial court erred by
denying summary judgment to GEICO when an insured failed to give
notice of an automobile collision for six months, which the court
determined was unreasonable and "contrary to the obvious intent of the
policy" as a matter of law.4 6 The relevant GEICO policy required that
notice of the accident be given "[a]s soon as possible" after an accident.47
Ironically, the court later referred to the language of Smith's policy as a
''prompt notice provision," invoking the actual language of the policy in
Bishop, which was found to be too vague.48
Note that in Progressive Mountain Insurance Co. v. Cason,49 which
was discussed in last year's survey.50 the United States Court of Appeals
39.
40.
41.
at 457,
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

338 Ga. App. 115, 790 S.E.2d 91 (2016).
338 Ga. App. 455, 788 S.E.2d 150 (2016).
CompareBishop, 338 Ga. App. at 118, 790 S.E.2d at 95, with Smith, 338 Ga. App.
788 S.E.2d at 151.
Bishop, 338 Ga. App. at 122, 790 S.E.2d at 97.
Id. at 116, 790 S.E.2d at 93 (emphasis added).
Id. at 120, 790 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 122, 790 S.E.2d at 97.
Smith, 338 Ga. App. at 457, 788 S.E.2d at 151-52.
Id. at 456, 788 S.E.2d at 151.
Id. at 457, 788 S.E.2d at 151-52.
626 F. App'x 916 (11th Cir. 2015).
See Cave, Schatz & Wolff, supra note 1, at 138.
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for the Eleventh Circuit held that Progressive's use of "promptly" was not
ambiguous and considered with other policy language requiring notice
"as soon as practicable," an insured's thirteen-month delay in notifying
51
the insurer was unreasonable as a matter of law.

III. OTHER AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CASES

A. Company Policies Cannot ForeclosePermissive Use Status for an
Employee Who Drives in Violation of Those Policies
In Great American Alliance Insurance Co. v. Anderson,52 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia had
erred in following a Georgia Court of Appeals decision, Barfield v. Royal
Insurance Co., 53 rather than a controlling Georgia Supreme

Court

decision, Strickland v. Georgia Casualty & Surety Co., 54 and reversed the
district court's judgment.5 5 Anderson arose out of an intoxicated driver's
collision with the defendant, Anderson. In violation of company policy,
the intoxicated driver was driving his employer's vehicle at the time of
the collision. Given the violation of company policy, the plaintiff, Great
American Alliance Insurance Company (GAAIC), who was the excess
insurer, sought a declaratory judgment that the intoxicated driver had
"exceeded the scope of his permissive use at the time of the accident,"
meaning that the excess insurer was not liable for the damages awarded
against the intoxicated driver. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of GAAIC and Anderson appealed. 56
The Eleventh Circuit held that the distinction between Barfield and
Strickland-whether "a company's internal rules could govern the scope
"irreconcilable," and that the cases
of permissive use" 57-was
represented "mutually exclusive premises."5 8 The court noted that the
holding in Strickland did not foreclose permissive use status for an
employee who acts in violation of company policies, while the holding in
Barfield did foreclose permissive use status under the same
circumstances.5 9 The court reversed the district court's decision after

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Cason, 626 F. App'x at 920.
847 F.3d 1327 (2017).
228 Ga. App. 841, 492 S.E.2d 688 (1997).
224 Ga. 487, 162 S.E.2d 421 (1968).
Anderson, 847 F.3d at 1334-35.
Id. at 1329-30.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id.
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noting that Strickland had not been overruled, that it applied to the facts
of Anderson, and that the trial court mistakenly "employed a Barfield
analysis."6 0

B. Workers' Compensation is the Exclusive Remedy for Employees Performing Duties in the Scope of Their Employment, Even if Their
Employer has not procured Workers' Compensation Insurance
In Saxon v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Co.,61 the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) 62 was the
employee-claimant's sole remedy, despite his employer's failure to
procure workers' compensation insurance. 63 In Saxon, an automobile
accident occurred when the plaintiff, Saxon, was a passenger in a vehicle
driven by his co-worker, Myers, while they were making a delivery for
their employer, Royal. It was undisputed that Saxon and Myers were coemployees and engaged in their employer's business at the time of the
collision. Although required to by law, Royal had not procured workers'
compensation coverage at the time. 64
Saxon sued Myers and Royal for damages. Starr Indemnity, the
insurer of Royal's truck, then brought a declaratory judgment action that
Myers' personal liability insurer and Saxon's UM carrier joined. The
three insurers moved for summary judgment, arguing that each of their
policies excluded coverage for Saxon's damages in these circumstances
and that Saxon's tort claims were barred because the Workers'
Compensation Act provided his exclusive remedy. The trial court granted
those motions.6 5
Saxon argued that, because his employer had not procured workers'
compensation insurance, he would be "unfairly punished" and
enforcement of the insurance policies' exclusions and of the Act would
violate public policy because it would not provide him protection up to at
least the statutory compulsory minimum automobile insurance
coverage. 66 The court rejected that argument, stating that Royal's failure
to obtain workers' compensation insurance did not deprive Saxon of a
workers' compensation remedy and did not punish him or leave him

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1334.
339 Ga. App. 495, 793 S.E.2d 659 (2016).
O.C.G.A. tit. 34, ch. 9 (2017).
Saxon, 339 Ga. App. at 497, 793 S.E.2d at 661.
Id. at 495, 793 S.E.2d at 660.
Id. at 495-97, 793 S.E.2d at 660-61.
Id. at 497-98, 793 S.E.2d at 661-62.
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unprotected.67 It therefore affirmed the summary judgment in favor of
the insurers.68
C. An MCS-90 Endorsement must be Evaluatedon a Trip-Specific Basis
In Grange Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Burns,69 the Georgia Court of
Appeals, in another issue of first impression, adopted the "trip-specific"
approach for determining whether an MCS-90 Endorsement applies, and
held that the MCS-90 Endorsement did not apply to an accident that
occurred during a purely intrastate trip transporting nonhazardous
materials. 70 The court followed the "trip-specific" approach, which the
majority of federal courts have adopted.7 1 It explained that "the
determination of whether the MCS-90 endorsement provides coverage
hinges upon an analysis of the trip route and the goods being transported
at the time of the subject accident." 72
The Federal Motor Safety Administration promulgates Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR),73 which require motor carriers
transporting property in interstate commerce to maintain minimum
liability insurance coverage of $750,000.74 A common way for motor
carriers to comply with this requirement is to have a MCS-90
Endorsement attached to their auto insurance policy. 7 5 The commonly
used name for the federally-required endorsement is "MCS-90," formally
titled "Endorsement for Motor Carrier Policies of Insurance for Public
Liability under Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980."76
The plaintiff sued for injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident
involving a box truck driven by an employee of J.B. Trucking, Inc., a
motor carrier, and, under Georgia's direct-action statute,77 included a
claim against the motor carrier's insurance company.7 8 J.B. Trucking had
a commercial auto insurance policy with liability limits of $350,000, and
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 498, 793 S.E.2d at 662.
Id. at 500, 793 S.E.2d at 663.
337 Ga. App. 532, 788 S.E.2d 138 (2016).
Id. at 541, 788 S.E.2d at 144-45.
Id. at 538, 788 S.E.2d at 143.
Id. at 536, 788 S.E.2d at 141-42.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 49 C.F.R.
See 49 C.F.R. § 387.15 (2017).
See id.

§§

300-399 (2017).

76. FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., ENDORSEMENT FOR MOTOR CARRIER
POLICIES OF INSURANCE FOR PUBLIC LIABILITY UNDER SECTIONS 29 AND 30 OF THE MOTOR

CARRIER ACT OF 1980, FORM MCS-90 (2017), https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot
.gov/files/docs/MCS-90%201-5-17%20508.pdf.
77. O.C.G.A. §§ 40-2-140, 40-1-112 (2017).
78. Grange Indem., 337 Ga. App. at 532, 788 S.E.2d at 139.
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the policy included a MCS-90 Endorsement.79 At the time of the accident,
J.B. Trucking's employee was driving the box truck in the course of his
employment. On the day of the accident, the employee,
picked up a box truck in Monroe, Georgia, and drove it to Norcross,
Georgia, where he picked up a load of 'sales papers' and delivered them
to a paper company in Newnan, Georgia. The sales papers were
manufactured in Georgia and were destined for end users located in
Georgia. While on his way from Newnan to Monroe County to return
the empty truck, [the employee] struck the vehicle [the plaintiff] was
driving.8 0

The court rejected the plaintiffs argument and the trial court's
conclusion that the MCS-90 Endorsement should apply regardless of
whether a specific trip is interstate or intrastate in nature, noting that
the plain language of the MCS-90 Endorsement (which is mandated by
the FMCSR), the plain language of the Georgia Motor Carrier Act of
2012,81 and the plain language of the FMCSR all make clear that the
Endorsement applies only when vehicles are presently engaged in
interstate commerce or when hazardous materials are being
transported. 82 The court also rejected-as contrary to Georgia statutes
and regulations-the plaintiffs argument and the trial court's conclusion

that a Georgia Uniform Rule of the Road, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-10.1,83 showed
that the Georgia General Assembly intended the MCS-90 Endorsement
to apply to all accidents involving an interstate motor carrier regardless
of the specific trip at issue. 84
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs public policy arguments that
the MCS-90 Endorsement should always apply. 85 According to the

plaintiff,
a Georgia citizen injured by an interstate motor carrier conducting
intrastate commerce of nonhazardous materials at the time of an
accident should "be given the same amount of protection as a citizen

79. Id. at 533, 788 S.E.2d at 140.
80. Id.
81. Georgia Motor Carrier Act of 2012, Ga. H.R. Bill 865, Reg. Sess., 2012 Ga. Laws
632, § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 40-1-126 (2017)).
82. Grange Indem., 337 Ga. App. at 536-41, 788 S.E.2d at 142-44.
83. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-10.1 (2017) (providing "[n]o motor carrier subject to the financial
responsibility requirements of the [FMCSA].. . . shall operate any motor vehicle upon the
highways of this state until such motor carrier has obtained and has in effect the minimum
levels of financial responsibility prescribed by such federal regulations.").
84. Grange Indem., 337 Ga. App. at 539-40, 788 S.E.2d at 143-44.
85. Id. at 540-41, 788 S.E.2d at 144.
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injured by the same truck, owned by the same ... carrier, and covered
by the same insurance policy, but whose cargo may be destined for
another state."86
However, the court determined that the plaintiffs public policy
arguments could not "trump the clear and unambiguous statutory and
regulatory language."8 7
IV. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. Reformation of Insurance Policy

&

In Occidental Fire & Casualty of North Carolina v. Goodman,88 the
Georgia Court of Appeals reminded us there are instances of mutual
mistake which can warrant reformation of an insurance policy. 89 R&R
Spirits purchased all of the assets and interests of Irish Bred Pub & Grill.
R&R signed an application for commercial insurance coverage from
Occidental; however, the application mistakenly listed Irish Bred Pub
Grill as the named insured. After a man was fatally stabbed at R&R and
his parents and estate sued for wrongful death, Occidental denied
coverage and refused to provide a defense to R&R, claiming it was not an
insured under the policy. A default judgment was ultimately obtained
against R&R, and R&R later assigned all of its claims against Occidental
to the plaintiffs, who in turn filed suit against Occidental for reformation
and breach of contract. 90
The trial court concluded the Occidental policy listed the prior owner
of R&R as the insured due to a mutual mistake and that the policy should
be reformed, and the court of appeals agreed.9 1 The court of appeals noted
that reformation can be used to correct the "true intention of the parties,"
if for some "mistake" it does not "express such intention." 92 Notably, even
if the application was in the name of Irish Bred Pub & Grill, the R&R
employee who signed the application believed the Occidental policy
covered R&R because R&R owned its assets and interests.93 Moreover,
the court determined Occidental "labored under the same misconception
that the name of the insured should be the prior corporate owner's
86. Id.
87. Id. at 541, 788 S.E.2d at 144.
88. 339 Ga. App. 427, 793 S.E.2d 606 (2016).
89. Id. at 428-29, 793 S.E.2d at 608-09.
90. Id. at 427-28, 793 S.E.2d at 608.
91. Id. at 428, 793 S.E.2d at 608.
92. Id. at 428-29, 793 S.E.2d at 609 (quoting Anthony v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 226
Ga. App. 846, 847, 487 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1997)).
93. Id. at 429, 793 S.E.2d at 609.
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name." 94 The court concluded the "clear intent of the contracting parties"
was to provide insurance coverage for the new business and that this
mutual mistake warranted reformation of the policy.95
B. Single v. Multiple Occurrence
In the context of multiple product liability claims, what test should a
Georgia court employ to determine if there is one occurrence, or multiple
occurrences, for purposes of insurance coverage? The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia addressed this novel
question in TravelersProperty Casualty Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.96
CKS, a manufacturer of plastic containers, filled its containers with gel
fuel that allegedly caused burn injuries when used in firepots. These
incidents undisputedly led to multiple injuries over time, resulting in
multiple lawsuits. Travelers Property Casualty issued primary
commercial general liability policies to CKS over five years, and
Continental Casualty Company issued five umbrella insurance policies
to CKS. Travelers concluded the burn incidents constituted one single
occurrence, exhausted its primary limits of $950,000, and notified
Continental it no longer had a duty to defend CKS or fund any
settlements. When Continental rejected its position, Travelers filed a
declaratory judgment seeking a determination that a single occurrence
caused all of the claims in the underlying cases involving the plastic
bottles.97 The court acknowledged that no Georgia court had applied the
"cause test"98 to coverage disputes arising from product liability cases,
and looked at decisions outside of Georgia. 99 Following discussion of this
persuasive authority, the court explained the "proper focus in
determining the number of occurrences in a products liability case is on
production and dispersal" of the product itself, and "not on the location
of injury or the specific means by which the injury occurred."100 The court

94. Id.
95. Id. at 429-30, 793 S.E.2d at 609.
96. 226 F. Supp. 3d 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
97. Id. at 1360-65.
98. In State Auto Property & Casualty Co. v. Matty, 286 Ga. 611, 690 S.E.2d 614 (2010),
the Georgia Supreme Court adopted the "cause test" to determine the number of
"occurrences" in liability policies. The court concluded that the "number of accidents is
determined by the number of causes of the injuries." Matty, 286 Ga. at 613, 690 S.E.2d at
617.
99. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., 226 F. Supp. 3d at 1368-70; see also Stonewall Ins. Co. v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 A.2d 1254 (Del. 2010) (applying the cause test and
holding that 460,000 individual product liability claims involving the same product were
the result of a single occurrence).
100. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., 226 F. Supp. 3d at 1369.
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concluded the same product caused the damages sought in the
underlying lawsuits and were therefore the result of a single
occurrence.10 1
In a similar vein, in Columbia Casualty v. PlantationPipeline Co.,102
the Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the application of a "continuous
trigger theory" 0 3 that would provide insurance coverage from multiple
policies over several decades for environmental contamination.1 04 In
1976, Plantation Pipeline discovered a fuel leak from an underground
pipeline, repaired the pipeline, and conducted cleanup the same year.
Earlier that same year, Columbia Casualty issued an excess policy to
Plantation. Several decades later, in 2007, contaminated soil was
discovered and was traced back to the 1976 leak by Plantation. In 2012,
Plantation filed suit against Columbia seeking to recover the amounts it
spent to settle third-party claims because of the contaminated soil. The
trial court ruled in favor of Plantation. 0 5
On appeal, Columbia urged the court to adopt the continuous trigger
theory in order to allocate insurance coverage to the subsequent carriers
that issued liability policies to Plantation from 1976 to 2007, as the claim
involved "progressive, latent property damage" over a period of time.106
However, the court rejected the application of such theory, as the
Columbia policy language did not limit coverage to property damage
during the policy period. 07 Instead, the court noted the Columbia policy
language did not provide that coverage applied to property damage that
occurred during the policy period, but rather required only that the
occurrence had taken place during the policy period. 108 As the Columbia
policy did not limit coverage to property damage that occurred during the
policy period, the court determined the case did not present any question
as to "how to allocate this type of loss among multiple, successive
policies," and affirmed in favor of Plantation and against Columbia.1 09

101. Id.
102. 338 Ga. App. 556, 790 S.E.2d 645 (2016).
103. The court noted this theory is a strategy for apportioning liability among multiple
insurance policies for losses related to environmental contamination over a period of time.
Id. at 561 n.7, 790 S.E.2d 648 n.7.
104. Id. at 559-62, 790 S.E.2d at 647-49.
105. Id. at 557, 790 S.E.2d at 646.
106. Id. at 560-61, 790 S.E.2d at 648-49.
107. Id. at 562, 790 S.E.2d at 649.
108. Id. at 562, 790 S.E.2d at 649-50.
109. Id. at 563, 790 S.E.2d at 650.
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C. Completed Work Exclusion
In Liberty Surplus InsuranceCorp. v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,1o
an unpublished opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit refused to provide "relief' to an insurance carrier "from
the consequences of the inartfully drafted, yet plain, terms of its
insurance policy," this time a "Completed Work Exclusion."111 A motorist
was struck by an oncoming train in a crossing owned by a subsidiary of
Norfolk Southern. The motorist claimed overgrown vegetation impaired
her ability to see the approaching train and sued Norfolk Southern and
NaturChem (the entity contractually obligated to apply herbicide to the
crossing area). Liberty Surplus, as the insurer, agreed to pay 50% of the
total cost of defending Norfolk Southern and NaturChem in the
underlying litigation. Thereafter, Liberty filed a declaratory judgment,
claiming NaturChem's "work" was already completed at the time of the
accident and the Completed Work Exclusion precluded coverage. The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia agreed
with NaturChem, which argued its work was ongoing and continuous
pursuant to the maintenance and monitoring obligations in its contract
with Norfolk Southern, and granted summary judgment in its favor. 112
In affirming the district court's decision, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that
the contract for NaturChem's work described "ongoing and continuous
maintenance and monitoring obligation, rather than a contract for a
series of limited and discrete tasks." 113 Moreover, the court rejected
Liberty's claim that the work was completed by NaturChem once it
completed its herbicide application, and instead concluded the work had
never been completed or returned to its intended use. 11 4 The court noted
that to conclude otherwise would "read language into the Policy that does
not exist." 115
D. PollutionExclusion
In Evanston Insurance Co. v. Sandersville Railroad Co.,116 another
Georgia court had an opportunity to test the boundaries of a pollution
exclusion in a commercial liability policy and again decided in favor of
the insurer. 117 A Sandersville employee "contracted 'welders' lung'
110.
I1.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

684 F. App'x 788 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 789.
Id. at 789-90.
Id. at 792.
Id.
Id. at 793.
No. 5:15-CV-247, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134162 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2016).
Id. at *1-2.
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disease from occupational exposure to welding fumes."1 18 Evanston, the
insurer which issued a commercial general liability policy to
Sandersville, refused to provide coverage based on the standard pollution
exclusion. Evanston filed a declaratory judgment seeking a
determination that the pollution exclusion in its policy precluded
coverage for the employee's claims.1 19
Following an extensive analysis of the pollution exclusion and its
history in Georgia, notably a 2016 Georgia Supreme Court unanimous
decision, 120 which upheld a nearly identical pollution exclusion for lead
paint exposure, the Middle District of Georgia agreed with Evanston and
upheld the application of the pollution exclusion to the welding fumes in
question. 121 The court concluded it "would clearly be error" to apply the
exclusion to only "traditional, or industrial, pollution claims." 122 Indeed,
the court concluded the employee "was injured from exposure to toxic
fumes resulting from his welding activities." 123 Moreover, the court
refused to accept Sandersville's claim that there must be an actual
release or escape of a pollutant from a "containment" and instead
concluded the "purpose of the pollution exclusion is to absolutely exclude
claims for injuries caused by pollutants." 124 The court seemingly also
distinguished and stepped away from prior Eleventh Circuit cases
involving "traditional environmental pollution claims" in the following
recent Georgia appellate decisions interpreting pollution exclusions. 125
V. OTHER POLICIES AND OTHER COVERAGE ISSUES

A. An InsurerMay Deny Coverage if the Insured Fails to Comply with
the Policy's Preconditionsto Recovery
During the survey period, both the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit and the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia addressed whether an insurer can deny
coverage where the insured fails to cooperate with the insurer's
investigation by not complying with the insurance policy's condition

118. Id. at *4.
119.

Id. at *4--6.

120. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 298 Ga. 716, 784 S.E.2d 422 (2016);
see also Cave, Schatz & Wolff, supra note 1, at 148.
121. SandersuilleR.R. Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134162, at *15.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *22.
124. Id. at *23.
125. See id. at *10; see also Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Advanced Adhesive Tech., Inc., 73
F.3d 335 (11th Cir. 1996).
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requiring the insured to provide the information and documents
requested by the insurer. 126 In Hsu v. Safeco Insurance Co.,127 the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether an insurer may deny coverage to
insureds who failed to provide their income tax returns as requested by
their insurer and as required by their policy. 128 The insurer denied
coverage on a homeowner insurance policy when it requested the
insureds' income tax returns and the insureds failed to provide them. The
insureds sued their insurer for coverage, but the insurer claimed that the
insureds were barred from recovery because they failed to comply with
the policy's preconditions before filing suit. 1 29 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the insurer.12 0
The Eleventh Circuit compared the facts in Hsu to Diamonds
Denims v. First of Georgia Insurance Co. 131 and Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hamler.132 In Diamonds & Denims, the court denied the insurer's motion
for summary judgment because the insured cooperated to some degree or
provided an explanation for its noncompliance and the insurer failed to
act with diligence and good faith in obtaining the information.133 After a
fire destroyed the insured's warehouse, the insured attempted to comply
with the insurer's broad request for "books and records," though most
were destroyed. Because most of the books and records were burned in
the fire, the insured offered to provide the requested information in an
alternative way. The insurer, however, never followed up on its
request. 134
However, in Hsu, the court determined that the facts were akin to
Hamler, not Diamonds & Denims. 135 In Hamler, the insured sued the
insurer when the insurer refused to provide coverage for items that the
insured claimed were stolen from her home. 136 After the insurer sent a
"lengthy and detailed request" for the insured's federal income tax

126. See Hsu v. Safeco Ins. Co., 654 F. App'x 979 (11th Cir. 2016); Durden v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
127. 654 F. App'x 979 (11th Cir. 2016).
128. Hsu, 654 F. App'x at 980.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 982.
131. 203 Ga. App. 681, 683, 417 S.E.2d 440, 441 (1992) (stating that "[a]n insurer is
entitled to require its insured to abide by the policy terms, and the insured is required to
cooperate with the insurer in investigation and resolution of the claim.").
132. 247 Ga. App. 574, 545 S.E.2d 12 (2001).
133. Diamonds & Denims, 203 Ga. App. at 683, 417 S.E.2d at 442.
134. Id. at 682-83, 417 S.E.2d at 441.
135. Hsu, 654 F. App'x at 981.
136. Hamler, 247 Ga. App. at 574-75, 545 S.E.2d at 12-13.
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returns, the insured refused to provide them.1 37 The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that, similar to the insurer in Hamler, the Hsu insurer
requested specific documents and "diligently pursued the matter," but
"the insureds failed to cooperate."138
Similarly, in Durden v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,

139

the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia considered
whether insureds may bring an action under a renters insurance policy
where the insureds failed to meet the policy's requirement to provide
material information to the insurer. 140 In Durden, the insureds' renters
insurance policy provided coverage for "accidental direct physical loss" to
personal property. However, the insureds were not entitled to coverage if
they "cause[d] or procure[d] a loss to property" or "intentionally
conceal[ed] or misrepresent [ed] any material factor or circumstance
relating to th[e] insurance." After the insureds were evicted, they filed a
claim for lost or stolen property that was considerably higher than the
amount that they originally reported to police. 141 However, they refused
to provide information and documents requested by the insurer,
including financial records, tax returns, and social media records,
because they contended that such items were irrelevant. 142 The district
court found evidence of possible fraud by the insureds; therefore, the
insureds "breached the terms of the Policy by failing to provide 'material
information' requested by [the insurer]."143 As such, the court held that
because the insureds did not comply with this condition precedent their
claim was barred, and summary judgment in the insurer's favor was
warranted.144
B. An Insurer May Rescind Coverage When an Insured's Insurance
Application MateriallyMisrepresents the Property
When an insurer discovers that an insured materially misrepresented
the size of his property on his insurance application, the insurer may
rescind the policy. 145 In Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Queen, 146 the

137. Id. at 578, 545 S.E.2d at 15.
138. Hsu, 654 F. App'x at 981.
139. 238 F. Supp. 3d 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
140. Id. at 1371-72.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1375-76.
143. Id. at 1380.
144. Id.
145. Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Queen, No. 3:15-CV-123, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8491, at
*1-2 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 23, 2017).
146. No. 3:15-CV-123, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8491 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 23, 2017).
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insured made a claim under his insurance policy to recover for fire
damage to an outbuilding on his property. Although the insured
indicated on his insurance application that his property was not more
than five acres, the insurer discovered that the property was eight acres
during its investigation of the claim. The insurer submitted an affidavit
stating that it would not have insured the property had it known its true
size.1 47 In finding that the insurance application contained a material
misrepresentation, the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
allowed the insurer to rescind the policy "even though [the insured]
thought he was only insuring his house and the outbuilding that sat on
less than five acres of his entire eight-acre parcel."148
C. An InsurerMay InitiallyAgree to Repair an Insured Homeowner's
Property but Later Pay the Loss Instead
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that when an insurer agrees to
repair damages to a homeowner's property, the insurer may later decide
to pay for the repairs instead.1 49 In Clary v. Allstate Fire.& Casualty
Insurance Co.,15 0 a lighting strike damaged the insureds' home and
caused severe fire and water damage. After initially choosing the option
in the policy to repair the damages, the insurer decided to exercise its
option of demanding appraisal and then to issue checks to the insureds
after the appraisal decided the amount of damages. The insureds
returned the checks, demanding that the insurer complete the home's
restoration. When the insurer refused, the insured sued, alleging that the
insurer breached its contract and arguing that once an insurer begins
repairs and restoration, it cannot change its election to the option of
paying for the loss.151 The court disagreed, holding that the insurer did
not breach its "contract by abandoning the restoration and instead
electing to pay the [insureds] the amount of the loss."152

D. Insurers May Be Responsible for CompensatingInsureds for
Diminution in Value under Homeowners Policies
In Anderson v. American Family Insurance Co.,153 the insured chose to
repair his home himself when it incurred water damage. The insured
147. Id. at *1.

148. Id. at *1-2.
149.
(2017).
150.
151.
152.
153.

Clary v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 340 Ga. App. 351, 351, 795 S.E.2d 757, 759
340 Ga. App. 351, 795 S.E.2d 759 (2017).
Id. at 353-54, 795 S.E.2d at 760-61.
Id. at 355, 795 S.E.2d at 762.
No. 5:15-CV-475, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84186 (M.D. Ga. June 29, 2016).
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sued when the insurer who issued his homeowners policy refused to
"assess and pay damages for diminished value" of his home after he
repaired the water damage. 154 The United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia found that the insured's policy did cover
diminished value. 155 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Mabry,156 the Georgia Supreme Court determined that an insurer's
physical damage provision in an automobile insurance policy covered
diminished value. 15 7 In Royal Capital Development LLC v. Maryland
Casualty Co.,168 the Georgia Supreme Court extended this holding

beyond automobile policies.159 Using the same rationale as in Mabry and
Royal Capital, the court in Anderson reached the same decision in
interpreting a homeowners insurance policy, explaining that "[a]lthough
[the insured] may not realize the full consequences of that diminution in
value until he sells his home, his home nevertheless allegedly
experienced a diminution in value as a result of the water damage."1 60
E. An Insurer's TypographicalErrorMay Cause a Contractual
Limitations Period to Be Unenforceable
An insurer's typographical error in communications with an insured
may be enforceable if the insured reasonably relied upon it. 161 In Webb v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,162 the insured's Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)163 plan allowed for only basic life insurance
benefits, not optional life insurance benefits or accidental death benefits,
if the insured committed suicide. When the insured died, the insurer
declared his death a suicide and paid his wife only basic life insurance
benefits. After the insured's wife asked the insurer to review its decision,
it responded in a letter with a typographical error. In the letter, the
insurer unintentionally stated that it would continue to investigate the
matter, but meant to say that it would no longer investigate the matter.
Because the insured's wife relied on the insurer's statement that it was
154. Id. at *2.
155. Id. at *13.
156. 274 Ga. 498, 556 S.E.2d 114 (2001).
157. Id. at 510, 556 S.E.2d at 124.
158. 291 Ga. 262, 728 S.E.2d 234 (2012).
159. Id. at 263, 728 S.E.2d at 235 (holding that Mabry was "not limited by the type of
property insured, but rather speaks generally to the measure of damages an insurer is
obligated to pay.").
160. Anderson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84186, at *11 (emphasis in original).
161. Webb v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 16-14565, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9155, at *1
(11th Cir. May 25, 2017).
162. No. 16-14565, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9155 (11th Cir. May 25, 2017).
163. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2017).
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still investigating, she was unable to timely file her lawsuit within the
plan's contractual limitations period when she eventually learned of the
error.164

The Eleventh Circuit determined that the plan's contractual
limitations period was unreasonable if the insured's wife reasonably
relied on the insurer's typo.165 One of the factors the court relied upon in
determining whether a contractual limitations period under ERISA is
reasonable was "whether an ERISA-required internal appeals process
was completed[;]" therefore, if the insured's wife believed the review
process was incomplete because of the typographical error, the
contractual limitations period would be unreasonable.1 6 6 The court
vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
insurer and remanded the case for the district court to determine
whether the insured reasonably relied on the typo. 167
F. Time-Limited Demands to Settle for Policy Limits
In Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Woodard,168 a case of first
impression, the Georgia Supreme Court, in response to certified
questions from the Eleventh Circuit, held that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1169
"permits 'unilateral' contracts whereby Pre-Suit Offers may demand
acceptance in the form of performance . . . before there is a binding

enforceable settlement contract" and "does not preclude a Pre-Suit Offer
from demanding timely payment as a condition of acceptance."1 7 0
Woodard involved an automobile accident in which Woodard's daughter
was killed. In the pre-suit offer to settle for Grange's automobile liability
policy limits pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1, Woodard's attorney
conditioned acceptance of a pre-suit offer upon the performance of certain
acts, including timely payment within ten days after Grange's written
acceptance of the offer. 171 Grange's representative accepted the offer in
writing in a timely fashion and informed Woodard's counsel that the
settlement checks would follow under separate cover within ten days.
When the checks did not arrive within ten days (due to an administrative
error in how they were addressed) Woodard's counsel informed the

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Webb, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9155, at *2-4.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *8-9.
Id. at *10.
300 Ga. 848, 797 S.E.2d 814 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 (2017).
Woodard, 300 Ga. at 858, 797 S.E.2d at 823.
Id. at 848-49, 797 S.E.2d at 816-17.
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insurer that Woodard considered the settlement offer to have been
rejected. Grange then filed suit to enforce settlement.172
Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and cited
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1. The district court granted summary judgment to
Woodard, and Grange appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. 173 The Eleventh
Circuit then certified questions to the Georgia Supreme Court, asking it
to interpret O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1.174
In addressing the certified questions, the supreme court relied on
common law principles of contract law to determine whether a settlement
agreement had been reached.175 "[T]he common law is well established
that (1) the offeror is the master of his or her offer, and (2) agreement
requires a meeting of the minds on all material terms."1 7 6 The court
concluded that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 does not contravene common law
principles and does not preclude pre-suit offers from requiring terms in
addition to the terms set forth in the statute, including requiring
payment as a condition of acceptance.1 77 While pre-suit offers made
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 must contain the five enumerated terms
required in subsection (a) of the statute, "additional terms are not
prohibited."1 7 The court declined to decide the ultimate issues in the
case: whether an enforceable settlement was reached based upon the
facts of the case and the consequences if the parties had reached an
agreement.17 9
Prior to the decision in Woodard, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in
Partain v. Pitts,180 determined that the insurer's inadvertent
communication to plaintiffs counsel, which occurred when a check
intended for the defendant's counsel was sent to the plaintiffs counsel,
did not constitute a counteroffer to settlement. 181 In Partain, an
automobile accident occurred when the defendant's vehicle collided with
the rear of the plaintiffs' vehicle. The plaintiffs' attorney sent a
settlement demand letter to a claims adjuster for State Farm, who
insured the defendant, and demanded a time-limited settlement for the
defendant's $50,000 policy limit. State Farm, through its attorney, later
172. Id. at 849, 797 S.E.2d at 817.
173. Id. at 850-51, 797 S.E.2d at 817-18.
174. Id. at 851, 797 S.E.2d at 818; Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 826 F.3d 1289,
1300-01 (11th Cir. 2016).
175. Woodard, 300 Ga. at 853-54, 797 S.E.2d at 819-20.
176. Id. at 856, 797 S.E.2d at 821.
177. Id. at 854, 797 S.E.2d at 820.
178. Id. at 855, 797 S.E.2d at 820.
179. Id. at 857, 797 S.E.2d at 822.
180. 338 Ga. App. 298, 787 S.E.2d 354 (2016).
181. Id. at 300-01, 787 S.E.2d at 357.
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attempted to communicate its acceptance of the demand to the
defendant's counsel. However, the State Farm adjuster mistakenly sent
a check intended for the defendant's counsel to the plaintiffs' counsel.
Thereafter, the adjuster issued a second check, which was in accordance
with the settlement's terms and time frame, to the plaintiffs counsel. The
plaintiffs' counsel informed State Farm that he viewed the first check as
a counteroffer because it was not issued according to the terms of the
settlement.182

The court held that the wrongly addressed check was an inadvertent
disclosure of a client-to-attorney privileged communication and,
therefore, could not constitute a counteroffer to settlement. 183 Because
the second check issued by State Farm was delivered within the deadline
specified in the settlement demand letter, such delivery constituted
acceptance of the offer and a binding agreement was formed. 184 The court
concluded that the trial court erred in denying Partain's motion to
enforce settlement and reversed the judgment. 185
In Linthicum v. Mendakota Insurance Co., 1 8 6 the Eleventh Circuit
determined that an insurer neither acted negligently nor in bad faith for
failing to accept a settlement offer for policy limits when the offer did not
fully settle the entire claim within policy limits. 1 8 7 The insurer was not

obligated to accept an offer to settle only a wrongful death claim within
policy limits where a separate possible claim for pain and suffering still
88
existed.s
Linthicum began when a drunk driver collided with and killed
the plaintiffs' son. The plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that Mendakota, the
insurance provider of the driver, acted in bad faith or negligently failed
to settle the plaintiffs' claim within policy limits. The insurer moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that it had not acted in bad faith
because the plaintiffs' time-limited demand for policy limits in exchange
for settling their claim was only for the wrongful death claim. The offer
did not settle a potential claim for the plaintiffs' son's pain and
suffering.189

"An insurer is not liable for failing to respond to a time-sensitive offer
to settle for policy limits when the offer does not resolve fully the claim

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 298-300, 787 S.E.2d at 355-56.
Id. at 300-01, 787 S.E.2d at 357.
Id. at 301, 787 S.E.2d at 357.
Id.
687 F. App'x 854 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 857.
Id. at 857-58.
Id. at 855-56.
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against its insured."190 The plaintiffs could sue both for their son's
wrongful death (as parents) and for their son's pain and suffering (as
administrator of his estate), even though plaintiffs argued that they did
not plan to do so. 191 Because the plaintiffs' offer for settlement did not
fully settle the claim within policy limits, Mendakota was not obligated
"to continue negotiations because the offer would have exceeded the
192
policy limits."

190. Id. at 857.
191. Id. at 858.
192. Id. at 858-59.
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